Bangladesh’s Elections and the Threat of Western Sanctions
In early January 2024, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed (Sheikh Hasina) secured her fourth consecutive term in office – and fifth term overall – in a disputed general election marred by political repression, boycotts by several opposition parties, and a record low voter turnout. Sheikh Hasina’s administration, which has been in power since 2009, has long been accused of authoritarianism, human rights violations, censorship of free speech, and suppression of dissent.
The 2024 election was condemned by Western governments and rights groups, among others, due to reports of vote irregularities and state-sanctioned violence against opposition groups in the months preceding the election. Prior to the 2024 election, the US administration imposed certain sanctions and visa restrictions on public officials in Bangladesh including those attached to law enforcement, fuelling rumours that the country would eventually be subject to additional wide-ranging sanctions. However, the situation appears to have stabilised post the election, with the US administration taking steps towards enhancing economic and geopolitical cooperation with Bangladesh.
Based on our conversations with well-placed sources familiar with Bangladesh’s political environment and foreign affairs, it appears unlikely that the US and other Western countries will impose additional sanctions on Bangladesh in the near future.
Overview of the 2024 General Election in Bangladesh
Sheikh Hasina’s political party, the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), won nearly 75% of the parliamentary seats (224 of 300 contested seats) at the general election held between 7-13 January 2024. This outcome aligned with the party’s substantial majority in the preceding three general elections (2008, 2014 and 2018). Several opposition parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has historically been the main opposition, boycotted the election over concerns about its transparency (the BNP had also boycotted the 2014 election over similar concerns). As a result of the boycott, there was no credible opposition and the BAL easily won the majority of seats, leading to The Economist describing Bangladesh as a one-party state.
In the months preceding the election, the BNP orchestrated various anti-government demonstrations, urging the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and advocating for transparent elections under an interim administration. The BNP, which had accused the BAL of vote rigging in the 2014 and 2018 elections, claimed that “free and fair” elections could not be held under Sheikh Hasina’s administration. The anti-government protests escalated into violence on 28 October 2023, when confrontations broke out between protestors, law enforcement, and BNP supporters. Subsequent to the incident on 28 October 2023, law enforcement came down heavily on the opposition; tens of thousands of opposition leaders and activists were arrested, and BNP offices across the country were closed (at the end of November 2023, over 50 offices of the BNP had been closed).
In December 2023, the BNP urged voters to boycott the general election. They also accused BAL of fielding “dummy candidates” as independents to try and make the election look credible and competitive. The BAL denied the allegations, saying that it was the democratic right of citizens to contest elections. A BAL spokesperson was quoted in the media saying that that approximately 30 BAL members of parliament were contesting as independents and another 35 gave up various party posts to fight on their own.
The general election saw a record low voter turnout of approximately 40% of registered voters, a figure that observers and analysts believed was likely inflated (the voter turnout in 2018 was over 80%). The low turnout reflected the electorate’s anti-government sentiment that was driven by the BNP’s calls to boycott the election and a widespread fear of violence and voter intimidation.
Understanding the Threat of Western Sanctions Against Bangladesh
The governments of Western countries, including the US and the UK, condemned the non-transparency of the general election, raising concerns about vote irregularities and political violence. More generally, the US administration has been critical of the deterioration of Bangladesh’s democracy and human rights record in recent years and has accordingly enforced various sanctions and visa restrictions on Bangladeshi officials since 2021 (other Western countries have not implemented any sanctions against Bangladesh to date). The US administration’s actions against Bangladesh fuelled speculation that the Biden administration would impose additional sanctions on Bangladesh in 2023 and following the general election. However, despite the controversial election result and the US view that the election was not transparent, these sanctions have not materialised, and US-Bangladesh relations appear to have stabilised.
We discuss key sanctions-related developments and our takeaways pertaining to US-Bangladesh relations below.
In December 2021, the US Department of Treasury announced that it was imposing sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) – an anti-crime and anti-terrorism unit of the Bangladesh Police established in 2004 – and seven of its members, for human rights abuses. The RAB has for years been criticised by NGOs and rights groups for using excessive force against the civilian population, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Several such incidents have reportedly targeted opposition party members, journalists, and human rights activists. The RAB was also involved in the clampdown on anti-government protests in Bangladesh in the months preceding the 2024 general election.
In September 2023, the US Department of State announced that it had started imposing visa restrictions on officials that it considered as being “involved in undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh”. According to the department’s press release, these individuals (who were not named) included members of law enforcement, the ruling party, and the political opposition, as well as their family members. The department had previously announced a new visa policy in May 2023, which gave the US the power to restrict the issuance of visas to any Bangladeshi individuals believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh.
In December 2023, reports emerged in the Bangladeshi and international press about possible Western sanctions on the country’s garment sector (a key economic sector for Bangladesh), following protests by garment workers against alleged violations of international labour laws. Concerns about possible trade sanctions on Bangladesh emerged earlier in November 2023, when US President Joe Biden issued a memorandum advocating for labour rights globally and threatening financial sanctions, trade penalties and visa restrictions on parties found to be engaging in anti-worker or anti-union activities. On 20 November 2023, the Bangladeshi embassy in Washington sent a letter to the Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce noting that labour issues in Bangladesh were specifically quoted by US officials at the launching ceremony of the memorandum. The letter further warned of potential impacts on Bangladesh’s apparel sector, which, for years, has attracted controversy for violation of labour rights. The concerns about sanctions were further heightened in early December 2023, when an unnamed Bangladeshi garment supplier to the US was warned of sanctions in a letter of credit (LC) from a foreign garment buyer. The LC reportedly contained a clause which stated that the buyer would “not process transactions involving any country, region or party sanctioned by the UN, US, EU, UK”. A local garments association later clarified that this clause was inserted as a precaution by the bank that prepared the LC on behalf of the buyer and that there was no real threat of sanctions on the wider sector.
US-Bangladesh relations appear to have stabilised post the general election. In early February 2024, US President Joe Biden wrote to Sheikh Hasina, emphasising economic and geopolitical cooperation. A US delegation also visited Bangladesh in late February 2024 and held a series of meetings with various government stakeholders, reiterating the US administration’s willingness to collaborate with Bangladesh on various fronts, including security and foreign investments. The delegation also reportedly spoke with Bangladeshi officials about potentially withdrawing the sanctions against the RAB under certain conditions (we note that RAB continues to be designated by the US OFAC as of March 2024).
Additional sanctions are unlikely: Based on our conversations with former diplomats and politicians who remain connected with diplomatic staff and intelligence officials of Western countries, we understand that the US administration and governments of other Western countries are unlikely to impose any new sanctions on Bangladesh in the near future. Our key takeaways from these conversations are:
The visa restrictions imposed by the US in September 2023 are widely perceived in government and diplomatic circles to have been ineffective. The restrictions have not impacted the day-to-day affairs of Bangladeshi political officials and business leaders. Any other sanctions could be equally as ineffective.
The US is unlikely to implement trade-related restrictions that would compromise US companies’ relationships with Bangladeshi counterparties. Several Bangladeshi conglomerates remain key suppliers to US companies (most notably in the textiles industry).
Bangladesh’s existing trade relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) means that it is partly insulated from the negative impacts of any potential US trade-related sanctions. The US would avoid taking action that would weaken its trade relations with Bangladesh and enhance the PRC’s position as Bangladesh’s key trading partner.